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THE LAW SCHOOL
Although the retirement from the faculty of one of its valued mem-
bers is necessarily a cause of regret, in the resignation of Professor
William H. Taft such feelings are merged in a greater sense of satis-
faction that one so eminently qualified for high judicial office has been
appointed Chief-Justice. Therefore, instead of lamenting his depar-
ture, the JOURNAL wishes to add its applause and congratulations to
those of the nation.
Since 1913 judge Taft has been a source of inspiration to faculty and
students. To have heard him expound the principles of Constituilonal
Law was iii itself a rare privilege, but his influence went far beyond the
classroom. No meeting or gathering of any kind was complete without
his cheerful presence. He will be greatly missed; but to express senti-
ments of sorrow because of the added honors bestowed upon him would
not truly represent the attitude of the school toward his appointment as
Chief-Justice.
The faculty has suffered another loss in the resignation, at the end of
the academic year, of Professor Henry Wade Rogers. He has been a
vital factor in the life of the school since 19oo, when he came here frnm
the Law School of Northwestern University. From 1903 to 1916 he
served as Dean; and it is due largely to his devotion and tireless energy
that the school has reached its present position. For some years past
[73]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Judge Rogers has been a member of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Yet
he has come up from New York two days. a week to continue his
courses. But the stress of judicial work has now become so heavy that
he feels unable to continue his connection with the school. We greatly
regret his departure, although recognizing the prior claim of his public
service.
Aside from these losses the faculty remains unchanged. A few
slight variations in the curriculum should be noted, however. Dean
Swan will take over the course in Private Corporations, formerly given
by Judge Rogers; Professor Borchard will again give Professor Taft's
course in Constitutional Law. The course in Damages will be given by
Professor Lorenzen. Property I will be taught by Professor Vance
and Professor Clark will take over 'Wills and Common Law Pleading.
The enrolment in the school is larger than it ever has been since a
college degree was required for admission some ten years ago. With
a total registration of 211, exclusive of students from other departments
of the University, we look forward to a year of progress commensurate
with the development of the past few years. The enrolment figures for
the last year and for the new term follow :
1920-1921 1921-1922
Graduate Class ............................. 5 3
Third Year Class ......................... 51 71
Second Year Class .......................... 73 6o
First Year Class ............................. 56 77
Students from other Schools of the University.. 46 51
Total.................................... 231 262
The most interesting element in these figures is the increase in the
number of the first-year class, which is larger by thirty percent than
that which entered in 1920-21. The decrease in size of the second-
year enrolment is due to the unusual number of transfers from other
law schools last Fall.
The summer session has been so successful that it is now regarded as
a permanent institution. The total enrolment included ninety-five
names, and, of these, seventy-two were registered for both terms.
Fourteen students completed their course and will be recommended for
their degrees at the next meeting of the Corporation. Twenty started
the first year's work, and seventeen entered with advanced standing
from other law schools. The session lasted from June 23d to Septem-
ber ist and was divided into two terms of five weeks each. The courses
offered included Criminal Law, Property I, Constitutional Law, Evi-
dence, Bankruptcy, Mortgages, Partnership, and Quasi-Contracts.
Professor Eugene Wambaugh, of the Harvard Law School, and Pro-
fessor W. L. Summers, of the Illinois Law School, conducted the
courses in Constitutional Law and Partnership respectively.
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COAL MINING AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
Every impartial lawyer who possesses any of the sportsman's instinct
will be pleased to see that the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act
has survived the first serious attack upon its constitutionality. To the
casual observer it would seem that this interesting piece of legislation,
so audacious as to be fairly picturesque, has about as much chance of
ultimate escape from its enemies as the infidel bystander must have
accorded to Daniel in the lion's den. Both coal operators and coal
miners, with fingers itching for each other's throats, are bitter and
persistent in their attacks, direct and indirect, upon the Act, which is
as popular in the Kansas coal fields as a constable would have been at
Donnybrook Fair. These attacks are supported by those engaged in
other kinds of business subject to regulation under the Act, the manu-
facturers of food and clothing supplies, and not a little aided by the
gloomy prognostications of those excellent lawyers who are convinced
that the rapidly expanding police power of the states is undermining
the sacred guaranties of the -Federal Constitution, and about to over-
throw the constitutional government of the Union. At the same time,
the third party in interest, the Public, from which the Act might expect
aid and comfort, is much busied about other matters.
In State v. Howat (1921, Kan.) 198 Pac. 686, decided in June last,
the constitutionality of the Act was assailed on nearly a dozen grounds,
but none of them were serious except the main charge that it attempted
to subject to state regulation private business, thus imposing on those
engaged in such business involuntary servitude, interfering with their
personal liberty, and their freedom of contract, depriving them of their
property without due process of law, and impairing the obligation of
their contracts, in violation of the guaranties expressly given in the
Federal Constitution.
The case came up to the Supreme Court of the State on an appeal
from an order of the district court, adjudging Alexander Howat, and
other leaders of The Coal Miners' Union, guilty of contempt in
calling a strike in the coal mines, contrary to an injunction issued under
the provisions of the Act. While the Court found it easy to decide that
the Act, in expressly recognizing the right of individual workmen to
quit work at will, did not impose involuntary servitude by prohibiting
a conspiracy to organize a strike with all its oppressive and coercive
incidents, it found greater difficulty in justifying the broad regulatory
provisions of the Act as a proper exercise of the State's reserved police
power.
The mere fact that the Act declared the production of fuel, and the
manufacture of food supplies and of clothing, to be affected with a
public interest and hence subject to state regulation, did not make them
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so,1 and this the court frankly admits. But a legislative declaration as
to social and economic conditions upon which action is based should
be respected by the courts, and it is well settled that the wisdom of a
legislative policy adopted to meet such conditions in the interest of the
public welfare is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.2 There
seems little difficulty in holding that, under modern conditions, the busi-
ness of mining coal, which was alone involved in the Howat Case, is
affected with a public interest. If the business of insurance, 3 of irri-
gation,4 and of banking,5 the use of trading stamps,6 and even the erec-
tion of bill boards7 and the renting of houses,. is so affected with a
public interest as to permit legislative regulation in the interest of the
public, surely coal mining must be so affected. The public interest in
the manufacture of food products and of clothing is not so manifest,
but the court, in declaring them clothed with a public interest, seems to
be well within the recent precedents. Indeed, with the rapid broaden-
ing of the social basis of modem political philosophy, the statement of
Judge Hough in the New York Emergency Rent Cases,9 that, "It may
be and has been asserted that any business is affected with a public
interest as soon as the electorate become sufficiently interested in it to
pass a regulatory statute," is not greatly exaggerated, although Judge
Hough distinctly said it was not necessary to go so far in those cases.
Once a public interest is granted, the right of the state to impose
reasonable regulations is now settled beyond controversy, even though
the result of such regulation is to restrict freedom of contract and per-
sonal liberty, to deprive persons of their property without process of
law or compensation, and even to impair the obligation of contracts.
That is to say, the solemn guaranties of the Federal Constitution do not
protect a person from the reasonable exercise of the state's police
power, but only from its unreasonable exercise. No rule can be stated
nor any line drawn which separates the reasonable exercise of the police
power from that which is arbitrary and unreasonable. Mr. Justice
Holmes, with his usual felicity of language, gives us the best statement
of the matter: "With regard to the police power, as elsewhere in the
1Producers' Transportation Co. v. Ry. Comm. (1920) 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup.
Ct 131; People, ex rel. Durham Realty Co., v. La Fetra, (I92i) 230 N. Y. 429,
I30 N. E. 6oi.
'Block v. Hirsh (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct 458; People, ex rel. Durham Realty
Co., v. La Fetra, supra.
' German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914) 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct 612.
'Clark v. Nash (igo5) 198 U..S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct 676.
'Noble State Bank v. Haskell (I9I1) 219 U. S. 104, 3 Sup. Ct. I86.
'Rast v. Van Deman (i936) 240 U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct 370.
'St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis (1919) 249 U. S. 269,
39 Sup. Ct. 274.
'Block v. Hirsh (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 458.
'Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1920, S. D. N.Y.) 269 Fed. 306, 3W7.
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law, lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact of
decisions on opposing sides."' 0 To the New York Court of Appeals, in
deciding that the Emergency Rent Laws of that State were constitu-
tional in spite of the fact that, by their provisions, lessors were deprived
without legal process of the benefit of their contracts and of the pos-
session of their houses, the police power is "a dynamic agency, vague
and undefined in its scope, which takes private property, or limits its
use when great public needs require, uncontrolled by the constitutional
requirements of due process."" Such a sweeping statement seems
shocking to a lawyer nurtured in an atmosphere of veneration for the
doctrine of the Dartmouth College Case,'2 and certainly asserts an
incredibly long step beyond the time, only sixteen years past, when the
Supreme Court of the United States declared the New York Statute
limiting work in bakeshops to ten hours a day, invalid because arbi-
trarily interfering with the freedom of contract.'3
The real question, then, is seen to be whether the restrictions placed
by the Kansas Act upon the liberty of persons engaged in the regulated
businesses and the use of their property, and the impairment of their
contracts, are reasonably adapted to meet the public need, or whether
they transcend that need and so are unreasonable and arbitrary. That
they are merely arbitrary and vexatious interferences with the conduct
of private business has been vigorously argued before the Kansas
Courts and in current legal periodicals. 4 But read in the light of the
Howat Case, and of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, especially Wilson v. New, 15 upholding the Adamson
Law, and the emergency rent law cases,' 6 it seems highly probable that
even the bold regulatory provisions of the Kansas Act will all be held to
be within the proper sphere of the police power of the state, which now
may be said to be substantially commensurate with the considered legis-
lative policy of the State. It is true that only the regulation of coal
mining was before the court in the Howat Case, for of course the
defendant could not raise questions that did not affect him, 7 but the
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 112, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, i88.
' People, ex rel. Durham Realty Co., v. La Fetra, supra note I, at p. 443, 130
N. E. at p. 605.
'Dartmouth College v. Woodward (18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat 518.
'Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct 539. Note also
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. (1911) 2Ol N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431.
"See article by J. S. Dean, The Fundamental Unsoundness of the Kansas
Industrial Court Law (1921) 7 A. B. A. JouR. 333; also paper by George W.
Wickersham, Recent Extension of the State Police Power (ig2o) 54 AmmE. L.
REV. 8O1.
"' (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct 298.
'Block v. Hirsh (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct 458; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct 465.
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases (1919) 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct
553. People, ex rel. Durham Realty Co., v. La Fetra, supra note i.
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language of the opinion shows unmistakably that the court intended the
argument upon which its decision was based to extend to the Act as a
whole.
It has been vigorously asserted'8 that the Kansas Act presents an
"entirely different theory of police law" from that heretofore recog-
nized, in that it empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to enter
affirmative orders commanding the employer who wishes to shut down
to continue in operation, requiring him to take certain persons into his
employ, to pay them certain wages, and the like, whereas heretofore
the police power has been used only to restrict activities and uses that
had proved hurtful to the public. It is sufficient to reply that the Kan-
sas Court can do none of these dreadful things arbitrarily; and that
affirnative regulations under the police power have not been unusual,
and have been sustained, as for example, where the Oklahoma banks
were required to contribute to a state guaranty fund, 9 and where, under
the New York Emergency Rent Law, owners of apartment houses were
required to provide elevator service and heating for their unwelcome
tenants.
20
The trend of decisions on constitutional questions during the past
year makes it clear that the friends of the Kansas Act have less to fear
from the courts than from the legislature.
W. R. V.
BONUS LEGISLATION
The rather startling decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
the recent case of People v. The Westchester County National Bank,
Sept. 12, 1921, 65 N. Y. L. JOUR. No. 138,1 has raised a new obstacle
in the road which bonus legislation has had to travel. An act of the
New York Legislature 2 provided for the issuing of $45,000,000 of bonds
by the state, the proceeds of which were to be expended for a bonus
to persons who had served in the military or naval forces of the
United States, at any time during the period of the recent war. The
terms of the Act required that it be submitted to the people, who voiced
their approval of the same by an overwhelming majority. The defend-
ant Bank was a successful bidder for bonds of the value of $25,000,
which it later refused to accept. The court acknowledged that the
Act would serve a public purpose sufficient to justify taxation. On
the ground, however, that it violated the constitutional provision3 that
" See Dean, op. cit., 7 A. B. A. JoUR. 333.
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 1O4, 31 Sup. Ct 186.
"Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 465.
'Official Report: 231 N. Y. 465.
Laws, 192o, ch. 872.
'N. Y. Const. art. VII, sec. I; art. VIII, sec. 9.
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"the credit of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any
individual," the Act was declared invalid. The court held that the
bonus constituted a mere gratuity or reward, and that it was not the
recognition of a moral obligation by the state which alone could have
placed it outside the scope of the constitutional limitation.4 Upon
this point, the crux of the decision, Justice Cardozo dissented, holding
that the unequal distribution of the burdens of the state gave rise to
the moral obligation.5
Bonus legislation has had its recurring periods during our national
history. The power of Congress to grant pensions or bounties to those
who serve in the military forces of the United States seems seldom to
have been questioned in the courts in view of the fact that the federal
pension system had its origin in the Revolution and, beyond question,
was sanctioned by the framers of the Constitution who were members
of the first Congress.6
During the Civil War, the expenditure of money by a state or
county for bounties to induce nen to enter the military forces of the
nation was everywhere held valid.7  The courts held that legislation
to this end did not unconstitutionally interfere with the war powers
of Congress, and that the purpose for which the money was expended
was a public and not a private one, in the relief afforded from the
necessity of drafting. It may be noted, however, that these decisions
for the most part were rendered while the Civil War was in progress
and the emergencies of the time were adjudged sufficient to author-
ize the incurring of indebtedness on the part of the state and county.,
The public purpose of the tax was not a pressing issue.
4"A payment to an individual is not a gift if it be made in recognition of a
claim, moral or equitable, which he may have against the state." Andrews, 3., in
principal case.
'Pound, J., in a brief dissent holds that the bonds being sold on the market, the
borrowed money becomes money of the state. The credit of the state is therefore
not given or loaned in any manner, and the money of the state is subject only to
the limitation that it be used for a public purpose, which he finds in the promotion
of military zeal in the future.
" United States v. Hall (i878) 98 U. S. 343; United States v. Fairchild (1867,
D. C. Mich.) i Abb. 74.
'Cass Township v. Dillon (1864) 16 Ohio St. 38; Taylor v. Thompson (1866)
42 Ill. 9; State v. Demarest (1866) 32 N. J. L. 528; Speer v. Blairville (1865)
50 Pa. 15o; Booth v. Woodbury (1865) 32 Conn. 118; Laughton v. Putney(0871) 43 Vt. 485; contra, Ferguson v. Landram (1867, Ky.) I Bush, 548, later
appealed, (1868, Ky.) 5 Bush, 230.
'In Cass Township v. Dillon, supra note 7, at p. 40, where the levy of a tax topay a bounty to each volunteer who had enlisted or might enlist was held constitu-
tional, the court said: "Looking at the occasion and object of the statute, it is, in
our opinion, authorized..... .It was enacted flagrante bello; and its object was
to aid the several localities .... in furnishing their allotted quotas of troops ......
See also Franklin v. State Board o' Examiners (1863) 23 Calif. 173.
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State legislation providing for bounties to soldiers for past services,
such as the New York Statute in question, is now valid by the clear
weight of authority, although it seems impossible to harmonize the
earlier decisions where the bounty was not given as a pension to the
injured or disabled. The view taken by some courts is that such
statutes are unconstitutional, if there was not an offer or promise
of a bounty at the time of entering the service, since they authorize
the expenditure of public funds for a private and not a public pur-
pose.9 The majority view sustains the validity of these statutes and
finds the public purpose of such acts in the stimulation to patriotism, 0
in the gratitude of the state to volunteers, who assumed a special share
of the public burden, thus relieving the community to that extent from
a draft," in the encouraging of military training and continued service
in the State National Guard,1 2 or in the discharge of the honorable
obligation of the state to recompense those serving in the military
forces of the United States.' 3 When it is remembered that taxation is
a prerogative of the legislature which should be interfered with only
when it clearly serves no public purpose, it would seem to follow that
the view adopted by the majority of the courts is sound. 4
The case under discussion turns upon the court's finding that no
obligation exists on the part. of the state, either in equity, justice, or
morals, to pay a bonus. Plainly the discharge of a moral obligation is
not a gift. A moral obligation on the part of the state is sufficiently
a public purpose to sustain a tax discharging it.' 5 There is difficulty,
9Mead v. Acton (1885) 139 Mass. 341, I N. E. 413; Opinion of Justices
(1905) 186 Mass. 603, 72 N. E. 95. But see Opinion of Justices (1912) 211
Mass. 6o8, 98 N. E. 338, a departure from these earlier decisions, holding valid
a payment, of $125 to each veteran of the Civil War by the State, in view of the
legislative declaration that it was "a testimonial for meritorious service." See
also Beach v. Bradstreet (1912) 85 Conn. 344, 82 AtL. 1O3O where the court held
an Act unconstitutional which provided for a -gift of $3o annually, as state aid,
to every veteran of the Civil War. But if the benefits of the act had extended only
to those. who served to the credit of the state, the result might have been different.
See also Crowell v. Hopkinton (1865) 45 N. H. 9; Schackford v. Newington
(I866) 46 N. H. 415. It will be noted however that the Legislature of New
Hampshire voted a bounty to the veterans of the recent war, the constitutionality
of which has never been determined. Laws, i919, ch. 14o; Laws, igig, Special
Session, ch. I. Bush v. Board of Supervisors (1899) 159 N. Y. 212, 53 N. E.
1121. Cf. Washington Co. v. Berwick (1867) 56 Pa. 466.
0 Opinion of Justices (1912) 211 Mass. 6o8, 98 N. E. 338; State v. Johnson
(1920, Wis.) 176 N. W. 224; Gustafson v. Rhinow (1920, Minn.) 175 N. W.
9o3. Note also principal case.
" Brodhead v. Wisconsin (1865) 19 Wis. 624.
'State v. Handlin (1917) 38 S. D. 550, 162 N. W. 379.
" State v. Clausen (1921, Wash.) 194 Pac. 793.
"Jones v. Portland (1917) 245 U. S. 217, 38 Sup. Ct i12.
""If there is a moral and .honorable claim upon the public treasury, although
there be no debt, which could obtain recognition in a court of law or equity, a
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however, in determining the existence of such an obligation; this is
a question of fact for the court in construing the constitutionality of
tax statutes. Courts should be governed by legislative recognition of
such a duty if there is any reasonable basis.' 6 To create a moral obli-
gation justifying an expenditure of public funds, the majority opinion
in the principal case held that there must be some direct benefit received
by the state, or some injury suffered by the claimant under circum-
stances where the state might in fairness be asked to respond. It is
not difficult to find elements of both. Under the draft system, the
amount of military services due from each community was determined.
The rendition of this service was a burden resting upon the entire
community and no more was due from one member than from another.
While service was required only of those within certain ages, yet it
was morally due for all alike. Certain members were exempted solely
because the law presumed their physical disability to bear arms. The
state is but the aggregate of those from whom the debt was due.
Does not the sacrifice and service of those chosen, a part having suf-
fered for the whole, give rise, therefore, to those circumstances
creating the state's equitable obligation? The majority of the court
have no difficulty in finding it imposed on the national government.
Such a duty has been recognized since colonial times and has found
expression in an act passed by the first Congress providing for pen-
sions and land grants to those who had served in the Revolutionary
War.17  It is thus difficult to follow the court's decision that there is
no reasonable basis on which the legislature might deem a moral obliga-
tion to rest upon the state, more especially where such obligation has
been recognized by a vote of the people. The benefit to the state is
direct, not remote. The United States is bound by its organic law
to guarantee to the state its form of government and to protect it
against invasion. The state is then vitally interested in the preserva-
tion of the national government and territory in all of its integrity
and power; defeat in a war might mean the loss of state sovereignty
and territory. The war was fought by united states for a mutual and
individual purpose; for the state to aid the national government,
basis for the exercise of the taxing power is furnished." State v. Clausen, supra
note 13 at p. 794; Wheeler v. State (1907) i9o N. Y. 406, 83 N. E. 54; Woodall
v. Darst (1912) 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264; United States v. Realty Co. (1895)
163 U. S. 427, I6 Sup. Ct. 120; 17 Rose's Notes on U. S. Rep. 705-707; Judson,
Taxation (2d ed. 1917) sec. 557.
"This is recognized in the majority opinion: "We are not forgetful of the"fact
that if there is any reasonable ground for the legislative decision that a moral
obligation exists, the courts may not intervene." See also United States v. Realty
Co. supra note 15; Oswego and Syracuse Ry. v. State (1gig) 226 N. Y. 351,
124 N. E. 8.
"Act of Sept. 29, 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 95).
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therefore, is but the exercise of measures in its own self defence.'
The Supreme Court of Washington specifically held that an act pro-
viding for bonuses to veterans of the late war involved a public purpose,
in the discharge of the moral and honorable obligation of the state
to recompense those who had served in the military forces of our
country.'9
The question no doubt falls within that twilight zone in which minds
may reasonably differ. The wisdom of bonus legislation and the
economic policy involved are for the legislature rather than the courts.
Legislative determination, strengthened by the vote of the electorate,
should have been sufficient to justify a decision favorable to the
Statute.
2 0
THE VALIDITY ABROAD OF ACTS OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET
GOVERNMENT
The acts of the Russian Soviet Government with respect to private
property, many of which have been deemed contrary to the funda-
mental principles of modern organized society, have now become the
subject of challenge, not merely in the chancelleries, but in the courts
of other countries. What may become a typical action is exemplified
by the case of Luther v. Sagor (1921) 37 T. L. R. 777, recently decided
by the British Court of Appeal. In 1919, certain lumber belonging to a
Russian company was confiscated in Russia by the Soviet Government,
under decree, and was later, in I92O, sold to the defendants in England
by the Soviet agents. The original owners thereupon sued the defend-
ants in England claiming a declaration of their title to the property
and damages for its conversion. They of course contested the legality
of the act of confiscation by the Soviet authorities and of any title
derived through such act. The lower court, by Roche, J.,' held that,
"State v. Johnson (1919, Wis.) 175 N. W. 589. Note also State v. Johnson,
supra note IO at p. 227: "We [the state] are an integral part of the nation; hence
a defense of the nation is a defense of us. In furnishing troops to the Federal
Government, we are in reality furnishing them to ourselves, because they are to be
used for our benefit." To the same effect see State v. Handlin, supra note 12; Cf.
Opinion of Justices (19o6) i9o Mass. 61i, 615, 77 N. E. 820.
"State v. Clausen, supra note 13; Gustafson v. Rhinow, supra note Io.
"The modern tendency of the courts to yield, to the judgment of the legislature
in those matters which are not purely judicial, but rather questions of policy, is
aptly shown in the extension of the police powers of the state. German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1913) 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v.
McQuire (Ig1) 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct 259. When passing upon the consti-
tutionality of a tax, the absence of a public purpose must be clearly seen. Booth v.
Town of Woodbury, supra note 7; Woodall v. Darst, supra note 15; Jones v.
City of Portland, supra note 14; Cf. Green v. Frazier (1920) 253 U. S. 233, 40
Sup. Ct. 499.
' [1921] 1 K. B. 456.
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inasmuch as the British Government had not at the time of trial
(November, 192o) recognized the Soviet Government as the Govern-
ment of Russia, the defendants had acquired no title to the lumber.
But subsequently, in March, 1921, the British Government concluded a
trade agreement with the Soviet Government, and in April, 1921, the
British Foreign Office issued a statement to the effect that "the Govern-
ment of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic is recognized by
His Majesty's Government as the de facto Government of Russia."
This new operative fact of recognition was deemed by the Court of
Appeal to change the entire aspect of the case. While upholding the
correctness of Justice Roche's decision as the facts then stood, they held
unanimously that recognition of the Soviet Government as a de facto
government by the political branch of the British Government pre-
cluded British courts from re-examining or questioning the validity of
the acts of the Soviet Government, as Acts of State of a foreign sov-
ereign State. They therefore reversed the decision of Justice Roche
and non-suited the plaintiff.
The decision, applied to novel facts, seems in accord with principle.
Municipal courts cannot question the legality or validity of the acts of
state of a foreign governrment, whether legislative2 or executive,8 pro-
vided they took place within the proper limits of its jurisdiction. 4
With respect to the judgments of foreign courts, however, such recogni-
tion as is accorded them is not obligatory, but is based on comity, and
is qualified by the universal rule that the court rendering the judgment
shall have had jurisdiction in the international sense.5
To obtain immunity from judicial review for the acts of a foreign
government, it is sufficient that the foreign government be recognized
as a government de facto by the political branch of the court's State.6
2 Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [19o2, H. L.] A. C. 176, i8o.
'Amercan Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (19o) 213 U. S. 347, 359, "29 Sup.
Ct 511.
'Reg. v. Lesley (i86o) 29 L. J. M. C. 97; see also Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878,
C. A.) L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 358; Dobree v. Napier (1836, C. P.) 2 Bing. N. C. 781.
No such inhibition, of course, rests upon the political branch of the Government;
but its challenge must be directed through diplomatic channels, with all the inci-
dents of an international dispute. We leave out of account the possibility of
judicial or administrative challenge in the courts of the country whose act is
questioned.
5Rose v. Himely (808, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 241; COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE
LAW JOuRNAL, 812, 815. Prize captures when in violation of the neutrality of
the state into which the prize is brought, and prize decisions generally in violation
of international law, are impeachable in municipal courts. The Santissima Trini-
dad (1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat 283, 351; The Estrella (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat 298,
308; The Appam (1917) 243 U. S. 124, 154, 37 Sup. Ct 337, 342.
'Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 168 U. S. 250, 253, 18 Sup. Ct. 83; Borchard,
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) 210.
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This distinction between the de facto and de'jure character of the gov-
ernment whose acts are brought in question was not kept altogether
clear by Mr. Justice Clarke in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., where a
taking of property by Carranza generals in Mexico was followed by
the recognition of the Carranza government by the United States, first as
a de facto and then as a de jure government. But recognition is neces-
sary, for the courts will insist upon guidance from the political branch
of the State. In the absence of such recognition, the foreign authori-
ties or faction claiming to be a government have no standing in the
courts' different from other individuals." An act of confiscation of
private property,. therefore, will probably receive no recognition from
foreign courts as a foundation of title, and Soviet property discovered
in the United States will doubtless be subject to attachment by the
victims of Soviet confiscations. Nor probably will recognition to the
Soviets be accorded by the United States Government until redress is
provided for or afforded to those American citizens whose property in
Russia has been confiscated. Lord Scrutton, in the instant case, enun-
ciated a reasonable and legally correct rule :9
"Should there be any Government which appropriates other people's
property without compensation, the remedy appears to be to refuse to
recognize it as a sovereign state, when the courts can investigate the
title without infringing the comity of nations, but it is impossible to
recognize a Government and yet claim to exercise jurisdiction over its
person or property against its will."
As to the time from which the immunity from judicial review of
governmental acts dates, it has been said in several cases that the
immunity is retroactive as to all acts committed from the "commence-
ment of the existence" of the new de facto government.'0 What this
date is, may sometimes be difficult to determine, but it is intimated,
though not decided, in the instant case that the Soviet Government
probably dates from November 8, 1917, when the Kerensky r6gime was
overthrown.
Distinctions may also have to be drawn in the case of local de facto
governments which exercise their power temporarily in limited areas,
Oetien v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct 309. See
also Ricaud v. American Metal Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312;
COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 812.
' Indeed, even less than individuals, for Judge Manton, in the United States
District Court, has just declined to admit the competence of the Soviet Govern-
ment as a plaintiff in the federal courts. Russian Soviet Republic v. Cabriria
(1921, S. D. N. Y.) 66 N. Y. L. Joup. (Oct. 5, 1921).
At p. 783.
10 Ui uerhill v. Hernandez, supra note 6; Oetien v. Central Leather Co., supra
note 7; Bolivar Ry. (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 1903; Ralston, Venezuelan
Arbitrations (1904) 388, 394.
COMMENTS
yet perform the functions of government. Validity is accorded to some
of their acts internationally and even by the Government which dis-
places them, for example, to the imposition of taxes and belligerent acts
of various kinds. 1' But this also is a rule of convenience, for validity is
not accorded by the succeeding government, at least, to the confiscation
of debts by the defeated local de facto government, and such confisca-
tion, in the case of the Confederate Government during the Civil War,
was not admitted as a defence to an action by the Union creditor after
the war.' 2
The second ground upon which the defendant's title in the instant
case was challenged was that the act of the Soviet Government was -so
immoral and contrary to the principles of justice recognized in England
that the British courts ought to disregard it. The Court of Appeal
declined to consider the case as analogous to those cases in which Eng-
lish courts have refused to enforce contracts valid where made but
deemed to be immoral or contrary to public policy in England.'3  In
refusing to regard the legislation of a country recognized by Great
Britain as "contrary to essential principles of justice and morality,"
Lord Scrutton gave expression to the following interesting dictum :14
"Individuals must contribute to the welfare of the State, and at
present British citizens who may contribute to the State more than half
their income in income-tax and super-tax, and a large proportion
of their capital in death duties, with the fear of a capital levy hanging
over their heads, can hardly declare a foreign State immoral which
considers (though we may think wrongly) that to vest individual prop-
erty in the State as representing all the citizens is the best form of
proprietary right."
While the boundary line between taxation and confiscation may be a
matter of metaphysical speculation, it would seem that absolute confisca-
tion far surpasses the point where differences in degree become differ-
ences in kind. Perhaps a more valid ground for estoppel could have
been found in article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles and its correspond-
ing provision in the other treaties of peace, by which the Allied Govern-
ments are empowered to confiscate the private property of ex-enemy
nationals. That unfortunate violation of international law and of first
principles of international commercial relations is calculated to under-
mine the stability of international economic relations and the security of
1 United States v. Rice (18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 246, 253; Fleming v. Page
(85o, U. S.) 9 How. 6o3, 614. Civil transactions are regarded as valid, if in
accord with the law in force in the area under de facto control. Thorington v.
Smith (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. i; Borchard, op. cit., 205 et seq.
IWilliams v. Bruffy (1878) 96 U. S. 176.
'Hope v. Hope (857, Ch.) 8 D. M. & G. 731; Kaufman v. Gerson [1904,
C. A.] i K. B. 591. See also Santos v. Ilidge (i86o) 8 C. B. (N. s.) 861, 876.
14 At p. 784.
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private property everywhere. The precedent is likely to be exploited
in the future.15
E. M. B.
PRESENT DAY LABOR LITIGATION
It is believed that the previous comments,, which have attempted a
somewhat hasty review of existing labor litigation, make obvious the
conclusion that economic and political questions are unavoidedly inter-
woven with the legal problems. It is seldom, perhaps, that the courts
professedly choose to become involved in economic discussions; they
consider their duty to be the interpretation and enforcement of existing
law. In labor disputes, however, the legal rules that they formulate
must be based upon social and economic policy. The people, as a
whole, desire and intend the establishment of an industrial system truly
in accord with democratic principles. The common interest requires
the stabilization of our industrial field, and most of this task has been
left to the courts.
It is essential first to consider the adequacy of our present laws and
to determine whether there is need for any revision. Ever since the
first group of employees banded together, we have had a series of
concessions to the labor groups. At the present time there is much
conflict and friction over minor points, such as picketing, which will not
be discussed, except to suggest that some reform is possible. The mat-
ters now chiefly in dispute, however, are generally conceded to be the
use of the injunction and the extension of the boycott.
The use of the injunction in labor disputes may be limited; but it is
submitted that where irreparable injury is threatened, it is sound policy
,or the law to grant preventive relief, and the unions may have con-
siderable difficulty in showing why they as a class should be exempt.2
"See COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 845 and F. E. Farrer, The
Forfeiture of Enemy Private Property (1921) 37 L. QUART. REV. 218, 337.
'COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280, 404, 501, 618, 736.
2 Mr. Frank Morrison, Secretary of the Amer. Fed. of Labor, states the labor
view as follows: "The injunction has become a favorite weapon of anti-union
employers in their attacks on organized labor. This writ, as developed and applied
up to within a comparatively few years ago, was for the protection of property and
property rights and did not apply to personal relations. To bring labor within its
scope, a theory has been evolved that the employer has a right in the labor of his
employees and that he also has a right in the patronage of the public, which can
be protected by the injunction process if workers attempt to divert it to other
channels. Workers insist that their right to labor is a personal right, and that
the patronage of themselves or their sympathizers is in the same category. If
the right to labor, or to refuse to labor, or to ask others to refuse to labor has
any element of property rights, the worker is not a free man. The labor injunc-
tions could be easily understood but for the economic and unethical theory that
labor power is a commodity." (March IO, 1921) YALE DAILY NEWS.
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If there is to be a change in this matter, it is suggested that collective
responsibility on the part of the employees is absolutely necessary in
order to safeguard the rights of others.3
The main objective for which the employees are fighting at the
moment, however, is the extension of the boycott. They maintain that A
should have the legal privilege to strike against B to compel B to cease
dealing with D (who conducts an open shop). Were it not for the
origin of labor law, it is doubtful whether A could be restrained. His-
torical reasons aside, it may well be argued that there is no sound basis
for declaring this to be a tort. True it injures the other party-B in the
supposed case-as well as the parties who are more directly involved in
the quarrel; but we must realize that our fundamental law does not
necessarily give relief in such cases. The good of the many may
justify harm to the few; and it is only where the circumstances are
deemed insufficient to justify such conduct that the conduct is tortious.
Thus A should be enjoined only if his conduct cannot be socially justi-
fied as a legitimate act in protection of his own interest. When A
strikes in the manner just mentioned, who can say ihat he is not seeking,
though perhaps indirectly, his own economic advantage? He is cer-
tainly striving to advance the cause of unionisn upon which he deems
his self interest dependent.4 Certainly the employee must himself
believe that the question is material to his interest, since he is willing to
face loss of wages and even starvation to gain this end.
The rules of law governing this relation between employee and
employer are after all mostly rules of warfare; they do not aim to
make a disturbance impossible, but seek to regulate it once it is started.
And until they are equalized, they are unjust even as such. Is there
any sound reason in logic or fairness why we should say that A may not
strike against B to compel him to cease dealing with D (employer of
non-union workmen), and yet that D, the employer, may refus to sell
to B because he operates a closed shop ?5 Is it equitable to allow D to
strike at A through B, and yet not allow A to retaliate in kind? . This
seems a serious divergence for any system of law, and some equaliza-
tion is desirable. Some courts have realized this and consequently the
secondary boycott is permitted in several states,6 and there is an inclina-
8 Cf. Mass. Statute recently enacted, which makes labor unions answerable in
damages. Act of May 9, 1921, Laws, 1921, ch. 368.
'See the dissenting opinion of Judge Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntier (1896)
167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N. E. io77, iO79.
As was brought out in the investigation of the United States Steel Corporation,
as published in the papers during January, 1921. Cf. also Cote v. Murphy (1894)
159 Pa. 42o, 28 At. 19o.
'Pierce v. Stablenen'rs Uhion (igog) I56 Calif. 70, IO3 Pac. 324; Meier v. Speer
(i91o) 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988.
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tion in that direction in other states.7 Equalization of the means of
enforcement is also necessary so that they may be applied to labor as
well as to capital.
What would be the result, however, if this rule were carried to its
logical conclusion? Practically all strikes would be allowed, and we
should soon be very likely to see a combined workmen's union, or at
least several strong groups, with their leaders controlling the industrial
situation. It is this prospect, doubtless, that has influenced the courts to
make concessions to labor with reluctance. That this is a real danger
goes without saying. It may be that anti-trust laws, or laws of like
character, could regulate the situation; it may be that other solutions
will be forthcoming.
The struggle of the employee rests essentially on an economic basis
and therefore it is necessary to understand clearly the objects for which
he is striving, i. e. (i) better working conditions, and (2) increased
economic reward. The former has been procured to a great extent as
a result of workmen's compensation acts, child labor laws, shorter work
day, etc. Public conscience has been awakened and reforms along this
line are doubtless of lasting duration. The second point, however,
presents serious difficulty. It is a platitude to assert that the employee
must receive a fair return for his labor, but it is extremely difficult to
determine what this shall be or how it shall be obtained. The employee
contends that he produces wealth, yet gets but a small portion of it in
return. His natural effort, then, is to seek a higher wage, which to
him represents a greater economic reward. His contention is true to a
certain extent, perhaps, but essentially the mere attainment of his
object is not a cure, for it puts into operation the vicious circle of higher
prices. Increased wages alone cannot be the solution, although the
changing value of the dollar and other causes may help along this
illusion.
There are two fundamental points involved in any sound industrial
life. There must be ((I) a fair distribution cost; (2) a fair return
to the employer for his capital or skill. But little attention has been
paid to the former. Present costs of distribution, that is the increase
of the consumer's price over the manufacturer's price, average from
twenty-five to one hundred per cent.8 The determination of a fair
'This is true of such states as New York where union employees are permitted
to refuse to work on non-union materials, which is certainly one form of a second-
ary boycott. See Bossert v. Dhuy (1917) 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582.
'Economists constantly deplore this enormous expense and suggest that central-
ized municipal-owned or regulated stores would solve the problem. From an
economic viewpoint it is evident that the consequent reduction in rentals, labor,
stocks, etc., would effect a material saving. The merits of this contention will not
be discussed except to point out that our present system is extreiaely wasteful, and
any reduction in this distribution cost will directly affect the reward of the
employee, by raising the purchasing power of his dollar.
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rate to the employer presents still greater difficulties. Undoubtedly
there will be an increased agitation for governmental regulation,9
and particularly so in regard to price fixing. Possibly it will be along
the lines of the Lever Act.'0 Some would go considerably farther than
this and urge that the government take entire charge of industrial
conflicts. This is the development expressed in the Kansas Industrial
Court, which is claimed to be eminently successful." If the state
decides to take over these matters, and thus to abolish strikes and other
labor troubles, it must be prepared to decide these disputes on an
economic basis and to effect a fair return to all parties. If the unions
are to be deprived of their privilege of striking, the state must be ready
to guarantee the economic justice for which the employee is striving.
It is doubtful whether this country is ready to take this step. Thus
far it has refrained from interfering to such a great extent in economic
questions, and there are many of its citizens who hesitate to make such
control a governmental activity. Certainly it is a radical departure
from precedent, but that does not necessarily condemn it. This
undoubtedly is a logical solution of. our industrial problem, the oppo-
sition to it being based chiefly upon political considerations . 2
The only alternative seems to be an extension of our present system
of collective bargaining, aided by governmental regulation. Before we
can decide against this latter method as unsuccessful in the past, it is
necessary to give both labor and capital an equality of bargaining
power.13 And it may well be that we must examine with more care the
claims of labor to a greater responsibility in the control and manage-
'Even such a conservative as Judge Gary has stated, in his annual report to the
stockholders of the United States Steel Corporation on April 8, 1921, that he
looked upon "publicity, regulation, and reasonable control" of business through
government agencies as a possible solution to our industrial problems. He sug-
gested that this be done through non-partisan, non-sectarian commissions or
departments, subject to review by the highest courts.
"
0Act of Aug. io, 1917 (4o Stat. at L. 276).
Governor Allen, of Kansas, speaking at Cambridge on April 25, 1921, has
summed up the result of the Kansas Industrial Court as follows: "It has been
in existence thirteen months, during which thirty cases have been brought before
it, most of them by union labor. Of twenty-eight decrees uttered, twenty-seven
were accepted by both employer and employed as entirely satisfactory. One case
was appealed, that by a railroad company. Two strikes only have been declared
within the life of the court, both small and each started by Alexander Howat, mine
union leader in that district, and for each of which Howat was sentenced to serve
a year in jail with additional fines."
See also Vance, The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations and its Background
(1921) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 456; CoimENTs, supra p. 75.
"2 This difficulty was well expressed in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia,
(1853) 21 Pa. 147 by Black, C. J., who said: "The wisdom of man has never
conceived of a government with power sufficient to answer its legitimate ends, and
at the same time incapable of mischief."
" See dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Coppage v. Kansas (1914) 236
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ment of industry. Joint control by the parties directly engaged in the
industry, rather than government control, seems more in accord with
our traditional .principles of government. The government must
always be ready, however, to step in and operate any essential industry,
such as the railroads or coal mines, if there is a complete breakdown.
This system does not guarantee economic justice, but it may serve to
make the parties realize that it is to their economic interest to settle their
problems by mutual concessions.
If the courts attempt to regulate our industrial situation by mere
deduction from legislative formulae, they may reach a result so out of
harmony with community needs as to invite a violent overthrow and a
seizure of legislative and judicial power by those who may be least able
to use it wisely even for their own material welfare.'
4 Our judiciary
cannot hope to escape criticism, whatever may be their action; but
either they must consciously assume the role of social law-makers, or
they must leave the field open to private war between classes.
C.D.P.
POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE STATE PRIMARIES
Widespread interest and much adverse criticism has been attracted
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Newberry v. United States
(1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 469, reversing the District Court which had
convicted Newberry and others of conspiring to violate the Corrupt
Practices Act.' While the Court was unanimous in holding that the
judgment should be reversed, it divided upon the question of the
constitutionality of the act as applied to nominating primaries and
conventions, holding by a bare majority that Congress has no power to
regulate the expenditures of candidates for the House of Representa-
tives or for the Senate in seeking a party nomination, but only when
seeking "election" in the narrower sense. The remaining members of
the court, the Chief Justice and Justices Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke,
denied that there was any constitutional infirmity in the act underlying
the indictment, but voted for reversal on the ground that the case was
improperly presented to the jury by the court below.
The constitutional provision involved is article I, section 4, which is
as follows:
"The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature
U. S. I, 26, 35 Sup. Ct 240, 248, where he states that it is in the equality of
position that liberty of contract begins.
"4 For a severe arraignment of the Massachusetts Court see (April 13, 1921)
26 THE NEv REPumLc, 17r.
'Act. of June 25, 191o (36 Stat. at L. 822, 824) as amended by the Act of
August 19, 1911 (37 Stat. at L. 25, 26).
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thereof; but the congress may at any time by law make or alter such
regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators."
It is fairly obvious, as pointed out in the majority opinion by Mr.
Justice McReynolds, that this alone is the source of Congressional
power over the elections specified. If there were no .such "provision the
states would have free and untrammeled discretion in the time, place,
and manner of choosing their representatives to congress. The argu-
ment of Mr. Justice Pitney, in his dissenting opinion, concurred in by
Justices Brandeis and Clarke, that under this decision the states them-
selves can have no reserved power to regulate primary elections,
because "whatever the states do in this matter they do under authority
derived from the Constitution of the United States," seems untenable.
The clause in question confers upon Congress certain powers which
otherwise would have been vested in the states by necessary implication,
and there is nothing to prevent the application of the Tenth Amendment
reserving to the states such powers as were not delegated; the decision
is thus not inconsistent with the power of the states to regulate and
control these primaries as they see fit.
Under this clause Congress has exercised the power of requiring that
representatives be elected by districts,2 of bringing about uniformity
in the time of elections, 3 and of providing supervisors of elections and
other means to see that they are legally and fairly conducted.4 The
extent of this Congressional power over the "manner of holding elec-
tions" had not been limited or defined by the Supreme Court and was
not in issue in the principal case. The question involved, raised but not
decided a few years previously,5 was merely whether the word "elec-
tions" includes nominating primaries and conventions. While the
present decision answering this question in the negative and holding
that Congress has no power over nominating primaries and conventions,
may involve some inconvenient consequences, especially in view of the
f act that under our present system the nomination of a candidate is
sometimes quite as important as the final election, it is difficult to dis-
agree with the reasoning of the Court in its interpretation. Nom-
inating primaries were unknown when the Constitution was adopted,
and while this is not in itself conclusive, how can we say that if such
a development had been contemplated the states adopting the Constitu-
tion would have chosen to give Congress the power to interfere in the
conduct of the various unofficial agencies by which candidates are
'See Ex parte Yarbrough (1883) io U. S. 651, 661, 4 Sup. Ct 152, 157;
United States v. Gradwell (1916) 243 U. S. 476, 482, 37 Sup. Ct 407, 409.
' See Ex parte Yarbrough, supra note 2.
"Ex parte Siebold (1879) 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Clark (1879) 2oo U. S.
399; lit re Coy (1887) 127 U. S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263.
'United States v. Gradwell, supra note 2.
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selected? The Constitution has proved conveniently adaptable to
changed conditions, but its framers were not so prescient as to have
been able to construct every part, if they had so desired, of the same
elasticity. Whatever disagreement there may be as to its merits, the
decision is welcome as a sign that the tendency to brush aside consti-
tutional obstacles for the sake of expediency, under the misused name
of "liberal construction," has not yet swept away all opposition.
Can an unincorporated labor union maintain an action for slander of
the union as a whole? The question is such a novel one that in the
case of Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Laborer's Union v. White
(1921, N. P.) 65 SOL. JOUR. 723, Mr. Justice Darling reserved his
decision on the point. If the labor union is to be considered as a class
of persons instead of a legal entity, it is familiar law that the class as a
whole cannot bring suit for slander.' And it is well settled that a com-
mon law suit cannot be maintained in the adopted trade 
name.
2
In England it has been held that to sue and be sued are attributes of
the ownership of property.3 In Canada, also, it seems that the crite-
rion is the property-holding character of the association.
4 But these
decisions do not relieve the situation of a non-property-holding labor
union suffering under the sting of a defamatory attack. In the United
States, in the absence of statute, the common-law rule applies and the
union cannot sue in its trade name.5 And as it has been repeatedly
decided that a labor union is not in "business," those statutes allowing
suit by an unincorporated association "doing business" within that
170 Am. St. Rep. 754, note.
'St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinder's Union (1go5) 94 Minn. 451, 1O2
N. W. 725.
'Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants [igol, H. L.] A. C.
426, holding that the statutes (Trade Union Acts of 1871 & 1876, 39 & 4o Vict.
c. 22, sec. 3) which invested the unions with certain corporate privileges, such as
owning property and acting through agents, had thereby impliedly imposed the
other legal attributes of a corporate entity. Subsequently the liability to be sued
was expressly taken away by statute. Trade Disputes Act of i9o6, 6 Edw. VII,
c. 47, sec. 4. This statute, however, did not take away the privilege to sue. See
Vacher v. London Society of Compositors [1913, H. L.] A. C. 107.
'Metallic Roofing Co. v. Amalgamated Association (903) 5 Ont. L. Rep. 424,
in which the Canadian view is stated as following that of the English courts.
The distinction between corporate and unincorporate bodies is now regarded
as a legal technicality and frequently overlooked where the unincorporated asso-
ciation owns property. See Smith, Law of Associatious (914) 70.
5Agricultural Extension Club v. Hirsch (i9xg, Calif. App.) 179 Pac. 430;
Diamond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (192o) 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. j079;
24 Cyc. 829.
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state, offer no relief.6  However, more liberal statutes have been
enacted in a few of the states allowing suit by such associations of five
or more persons operating under a distinguishing name.7
Because of the peculiar nature of the modern labor union as a mutual
protective, rather than a business association, and their almost univer-
sal practice of remaining unincorporated, it seems that legislation allow-
ing suit is necessary in order to afford a remedy. Otherwise, in many
jurisdictions the labor union is left without redress against even the
most unjust and malicious attacks on its good name.
A parent has been held to have such a near-property interest in his
children as to entitle him to equitable relief against evil-doers who
would lead them astray.' No doubt many will take great satisfaction in
the decision in Fisher v. Star Co. (1921) 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E. 133,
holding that "Bud" Fisher has a like property interest in "Mutt" and
"Jeff." The court fully realized that the plaintiff had himself endowed
his popular offspring with "grotesque figures" and that their charac-
ters are "imaginary and fictitious." Even so, he is entitled to an injunc-
tion to prevent their further demoralization and the destruction of their
financial value to him by "inferior imitation." Other cartoonists may
perhaps be legally privileged to name their own creations after the more
celebrated family of Mr. Fisher; but they must not imitate either names
or faces in such fashion as to deceive an uncritical public into thinking
that they are looking at the genuine Fisher tribe. The court holds that
this would be unfair competition in cartoons, a breach of the plaintiff's
rights in rem, rights wholly the creation of equity and in no way
dependent upon the federal statutes as to copyrights and trademarks.
It is of some interest that the court quotes and relies upon the decision
in the Associated Press case,2 where the defendant was enjoined from
printing news collected by another. In holding this to be unfair com-
petition, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "The ordinary case is palming off
the defendant's product as the plaintiff's, but the same evil may follow
from the opposite falsehood-from saying, whether in words or by
implication,3 that the plaintiff's product is the defendant's."
'Warman Steel Casting Co. v. Redondo Beach Chamber of Commerce (1917)
34 Calif. App. 37, 166 Pac. 856; Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co. (19o4) i8o Mo.
241, 79 S. W. 136.
'N. Y. C. C. P. sec. i9ig, allowing suit by unincorporated associations of
seven or more persons to be brought in the name of the trustees; Mich. Comp.
Laws, 1915, ch. 12363, sec. 12. See also Mass. Laws, 1921, ch. 368.
'Stark v. Hamilton (1919) 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861; (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 344.
'International News Serice v. Associated Press (1918) 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup.
Ct. 68; COMMENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 387.
'For a thorough treatment of the subject of Unfair Competition see Haines,
Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 YALE_ LAW JOURNAL, 1.
